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Abstract
The theory of rational addiction assumes that addicts’ behavior is fully rational. Common
sense and psychological introspection suggest, however, that addictive behavior is irrational.
Without knowledge of the addicts’ preferences this dispute cannot be resolved. This paper
reports the results of an experiment in which addictive preferences were induced. It turns out
that ‘addicts’ consume systematically too much compared to the optimal consumption deci-
sion. We explain this systematic excess consumption in terms of the psychologically salient
features of addictive goods.
I. Introduction
Most people seem to believe that addictive substances are ultimately
harmful to the consumers. Moreover, even those who are addicted to
certain substances often express the view that their addiction will ultima-
tely hurt them and that, as a consequence, they would prefer to stop
consuming or at least reduce their consumption of the addictive good. This
divergence between behaviorally revealed preferences and verbally
expressed preferences indicates the possibility that addicted people do not
behave according to their best interests. Instead, their consumption
choices may be affected by behavioral principles other than the maximiza-
tion of their interests or there may be factors that limit their abilities to do
so. A major competitor of any theory that views addiction as irrational
behavior is, of course, the theory of rational addiction; see Becker and
Murphy (1988). From the viewpoint of Becker and Murphy, addicts exhibit
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Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02148, USA.consistent, forward looking and individually optimal behavior. They know
their preferences and the constraints they face and are fully capable of
understanding the trade-off between present beneﬁts and future costs.
The purpose of this paper is to directly test the theory of rational
addiction. To achieve this purpose we used the induced value approach as
developed by experimental economists; cf. e.g. Smith (1976). In our
context the major advantage of this approach is that it allows tight control
over subjects’ true preferences. Therefore, we can directly compare the
actual behavior of experimental subjects with the optimal behavior
dictated by the experimentally induced preferences.
At present there seem to be two economic-psychological approaches
which try to account for addictive behavior as irrationally myopic behavior.
One approach is based on the notion of melioration, as in Herrnstein and
Prelec (1992), while the other relies on the assumption of time-inconsist-
ent preferences, as in e.g. Ainslie (1992). The melioration hypothesis
stipulates that, in general, individuals tend to equalize the temporary
average returns of different activities. In its pure form, the melioration
hypothesis says that subjects neglect the intertemporal effects of present
decisions completely. The melioration hypothesis is supported by the
results of several animal experiments; for a review see Heyman and Herrn-
stein (1986). Other animal experiments, however, have reported ambig-
uous results; see Green et al. (1983). The evidence also seems to be
ambiguous for human subjects; cf. Herrnstein et al. (1986, 1993). A central
feature of most melioration experiments has been that subjects did not
know their (experimentally induced) preferences. Instead, they had to
learn their preferences by experiencing the rewards of their decisions in
each period.
In our view, the assumption that people have to learn their preferences
from the pleasure they experience in consuming different goods is plau-
sible. Yet, it is equally plausible that under such circumstances subjects are
unlikely to achieve the maximization outcome that corresponds to the full
information situation. Since subjects face an additional constraint if they
do not know their preferences and since this constraint is likely to be
binding at least initially, proponents of the rational choice view could
discount the results of those experiments in which subjects are close to the
melioration outcome. There is then a danger that the answer regarding the
rationality of addictive behavior would become a matter of belief. Those
who adhere to the rational choice view of addiction believe that by and
large people know their preferences while the others believe that people
are severely constrained by incomplete information about their
preferences.
To avoid such a conﬂict of beliefs, we decided to design our experiment
on the terrain of rational choice theory. Our experimental subjects were
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tion, to understand the intertemporal effects of their decisions they
received explicit training before the start of the experiment. Therefore, if
they deviated signiﬁcantly and in a systematic way from the optimal
consumption path, the results would cast doubts on a rational choice view
of addiction.
Irrational consumption decisions may also arise if subjects have time-
inconsistent preferences. This has been shown by Strotz (1956) and Yaari
(1977), and more recently Laibson (1994).1 Yet, to give the rational choice
view the best chance we refrained from inducing inconsistent preferences.
In our experiment, subjects had consistent preferences which were fully
known to themselves. The experimental design favored the rational choice
view in a further sense: although irrational excess consumption of addictive
substances may have much to do with the uncertainties regarding when,
how much and how long future costs arise we refrained from introducing
such uncertainties.
In total, we eliminated three factors that may well cause irrational
behavior in the context of the consumption of addictive substances. Prefer-
ences of experimental subjects were (i) consistent, (ii) fully known and (iii)
not subject to any uncertainty. In addition, subjects were offered extensive
and costless training and learning opportunities, which are described in
more detail in Section III. Yet, although the experimental conditions were
rather favorable for the conﬁrmation of the rational choice view of addic-
tion, subjects’ behavior deviated signiﬁcantly from the optimal consump-
tion path. Moreover, this deviation is not irregular but very systematic. In
almost all periods, subjects consumed too much relative to their true
preferences. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the
model which was implemented experimentally along with the numerical
predictions for the optimal consumption path. Section III describes the
experimental implementation in more detail and Section IV reports the
results. Section V summarizes the results and provides an interpretation of
the behavioral facts in terms of the psychologically salient features of the
decision problem.
II. The Model
The basis for our experiment is the model of rational addiction as
developed by Becker and Murphy (1988). We directly implemented a
1There exists rather convincing evidence that animals and human subjects frequently exhibit
time-inconsistent behavior; see Ainslie (1975), Thaler (1981), Kagel and Green (1987) and
Loewenstein and Thaler (1989).
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Becker-Murphy (B&M) model has the following structure. The utility of
an individual at any time t, ut, depends on actual consumption ct and the
stock of consumption (addiction) capital St:
ut=u(ct, St). (1)
Consumption ct takes place at the beginning of the period and, hence, ut
also accrues at the beginning. The consumption stock St is built up by past
consumption according to
St=(1µd)Stµ1+ctµ1, (2)
where d represents the rate of depreciation, while St-1 and ct-1 denote
consumption capital and consumption at t-1, respectively. If T is an indivi-
dual’s lifetime and s her rate of time preference, lifetime utility as viewed





Let At be wealth at the beginning of period t, r the interest rate in a
perfectly competitive capital market, pc the price of the consumption good,
and w the income per period. As in B&M, we assume r=s. In any given
period w can be expended on consumption pcct, or it can be used to change
the stock of wealth by At+1/(1+r)µAt which affects consumption oppor-
tunities in the future. Since we assume the existence of a perfectly competi-





In our context pc,r=s, w, S1 and A1 are exogenously given. A rational
individual chooses a consumption sequence (c1, c2,...,cT) to maximize UT
subject to (2) and (4) and the nonnegativity constraints ctE0 and
AT+1E0.
By imposing further assumptions on the utility function (1) it is possible
to capture important aspects of the effects of addictive substances. First of
all, and perhaps most importantly, an increase in current consumption ct
2In the experiment we induced a positive rate of time preference s by paying interest on the
amounts of money which accrued in periods tRT. This was done because we conjectured that
it is easier for subjects to understand the concept of compound interest than the concept of
discounting.
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important assumption of the rational addiction model is
q2ut/qctqSt=ucSa0. Addiction is frequently characterized by so-called
reinforcement effects, i.e., an increase in past consumption leads to an
increase in present and future consumption. B&M show that ucSa0 is a
necessary condition for reinforcement.
Numerical Implementation and the Optimal Consumption Path











with  a0=0,  ac=0.6,  acc=µ0.01,  aS=µ0.06,  aSS=µ6Å10µ6 and
acS=6Å10µ5. The parameters in (5) ensure that u(ct,  St) is strictly
concave and that within the relevant range all assumptions of B&M are
met. Regarding the other parameters we implemented
d=0.1, r=s=0.03, T=30, w=10, pc=1, A1=0 and S1=0. (6)
Except for the ﬁnite time horizon no particular intentions are behind the
parameters in (6). It would have been possible to implement an inﬁnite but
random time horizon. Yet, apart from the problem of how to make
subjects believe that the length of the experiment is randomly selected,
there is the difﬁculty that experimental subjects frequently make the
following mistake.3 If the probability of ending is, let’s say, 0.1, they believe
that the experiment will end in period 10. And if it does not end in period
10 they are either confused or believe strongly that it must end in the near
future. In the context of our experiment, a random horizon would have
favored the excess consumption hypothesis. If subjects believe that the
experiment will end soon, they will tend to use up their wealth for
consumption purposes because — due to the expectation of a small
number of remaining periods — expected future costs are curtailed.
With a ﬁnite horizon, consumption of addictive substances will also be
shifted towards the end because of the smaller number of remaining
periods in which costs can accrue. Yet, within a ﬁnite horizon framework,
3J. D. Hey brought this problem to our attention. He has conducted random horizon
experiments in which this phenomenon occurred.
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path is given by
ct=µ0.025Å0.904t+0.932Å1.140t+0.182. (7)
This path is monotonically increasing (see also Figure 1).4
The Conditionally Optimal Consumption Path
In the theory of rational addiction subjects do not deviate from the optimal
path. Therefore, only the optimal consumption path is of interest and
relevance. Yet, in an experiment we cannot rule out that subjects choose
nonoptimal consumption levels. In case that an individual deviates, for
whatever reason, from the optimal consumption path in some period tb[1,
t], her stock of consumption capital St+1 and her wealth At+1 are
affected. As a consequence, her optimal consumption path from period
t+1 onwards is also affected. We call the ‘new’ optimal consumption path
‘conditionally optimal’ because it is optimal for the actually given values of
St+1 and At+1. If an individual has consumed too much relative to the
optimal consumption path in tb[1, t], St+1 is larger and At+1 is smaller
compared to the optimal stock levels. As a consequence, the optimal
consumption level ct+1 conditional on St+1 and At+1 is lower than the
optimal level in the absence of past errors. Since it is not impossible that
subjects learn how to make optimal consumption decisions during the
course of a 30-period experiment, the relevant standard of comparison is
the conditionally optimal level cco.
III. The Experimental Design
Structure
In our experiment we implemented the model described in the preceding
section in a computerized laboratory. To avoid a loss of control over
subjects’ preferences we did not frame the experiment as an addiction
problem. Instead it was framed as a problem of buying goods in different
time periods with a limited amount of resources. By buying goods subjects
4Equation (7) gives the optimal path if ct can be any nonnegative real number. In the
experiment  ct was restricted to nonnegative integers. This implies only a negligible efﬁciency
loss of less than one tenth of a percent of the maximum utility in the absence of the integer
constraint.
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the end of the experiment. The endowment w and wealth At were
expressed in points, consumption ct and addiction capital St in units of
goods, whereas utility u(ct) accrued in terms of experimental money.
Experimental money was called Guilders and the exchange rate between
real money (=Austrian Schillings) and Guilders was 1:1. This exchange
rate was public information. In each period subjects received an endow-
ment of w=10 points. They could use these points for the purchase of
goods, that is, for consumption purposes (cta0) and/or they could save
them (cts10). Positive consumption (cta0) led to a gain in terms of
Guilders according to the prespeciﬁed utility function (5). When subjects
had made their consumption decision in a given period, the gain in terms
of Guilders was added to a Guilders account. Paying three percent interest
on this account in each period induced the time preference s=0.03.
If – in a given period – subjects consumed less than w=10, the differ-
ence (wµct) was added to a savings account5 which also earned interest of
r=0.03. If, on the other hand, (wµct) was negative, subjects dissaved or,
in case the savings account became negative, raised a loan. The savings
account (credit account) mimicked a perfect capital market. In any given
period subjects had the opportunity to use up their whole discounted
future endowments plus their savings account plus their present endow-
ment for consumption. In each period the discounted value of total
resources available for consumption in that period was shown on the
screen.
Subjects made their decisions by choosing among the numbers of a
consumption schedule on their computer screen (see Screen A1 in the
Appendix). The consumption schedule was supplemented by a Guilder
schedule that indicated how many Guilders (utility) were associated with
each consumption level. Thus, in each period, subjects had the information
about the temporal utility function that was relevant in that period, u(ct, ·),
on the (right hand side of the) computer screen. Before making a decision
they could scroll this utility schedule up and down as they liked.
Subjects’ consumption decisions and the depreciation of addiction
capital led to changes in St. Hence, in general the temporal utility function
u(ct, ·) changes from one period to the next. While the computer auto-
matically informed subjects about their relevant temporal utility functions,
information about the total utility function u(ct, St) was given to subjects
by a large matrix (see Table A1 in the Appendix). In this matrix, which was
called ‘transformation scheme’ in the experiment, St is termed ‘current
5Since the term ‘saving’ might evoke positive (or negative) connotations, we called the
savings account ‘point account’ in the experiment.
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matrix displayed the associated temporal utility function. For example, if a
subject had accumulated an addiction capital of S=60 and consumed 18
units, the temporal utility gain was given by 5.6 Guilders.
The transformation scheme provided subjects – for the relevant
S-interval – with the information about (5). As one can see, it is very easy
to calculate temporal utility gains from ct whereas the total amount of
discounted utility losses which accrues in future periods due to the present
consumption level is much more difﬁcult to grasp.
Our design ensures that the experiment is fully isomorphic to the model
presented in Section II. The maximization of compounded (or discounted)
income is tantamount to the maximization of the intertemporal utility
function (5). The main incentive for subjects to participate was our
promise that they could earn money in a decision-making experiment.
Therefore, it is safe to assume that they were primarily interested in the
maximization of Guilders. This presumption is reinforced by two addi-
tional considerations. Subjects were undergraduate students of business
administration for whom the maximization of monetary returns is a rather
familiar and subjectively approved concept. Moreover, they were chal-
lenged by the problem per se, that is, they took their Guilders score as an
indication of how well they had solved the problem.
It is worthwhile to stress that from the perspective of testing the theory
of rational addiction and of investigating the link between true preferences
and actual behavior, this motivation is highly desirable because it allows an
isomorphic implementation of the rational addiction model and an unam-
biguous determination of the optimal consumption sequence. If, instead,
subjects would have had a different motivation, we would have lost control
over subjects’ preferences and, as a consequence, we would have been
unable to determine the optimal and the conditionally optimal consump-
tion paths. Of course, without knowledge of these paths, it is no longer
possible to decide whether a particular consumption sequence exhibits
myopic excess consumption.
Thus, there are obvious beneﬁts if money earnings are the sole motiva-
tor. On the other hand, several authors have argued that addiction is
characterized by motivational conﬂicts (’multiple selves’) within the person
and that these conﬂicts give rise to excess consumption. In our experiment
such conﬂicts did not arise because subjects had a clear, one-dimensional
motivation. In our view, however, the absence of motivational conﬂicts is
an advantage because it allows us to ﬁnd out whether there are other
relevant factors, such as cognitive limitations, which contribute to excess
consumption. If, instead, we had introduced motivational conﬂicts (e.g. by
inducing time-inconsistent preferences) the effects of these other factors
would have been confounded.
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Before the start of the experiment subjects received written instructions.6
Besides a description of the decision problem, the instructions contained
many examples. The purpose of these examples was to inform subjects as
well as possible about the decision opportunities and consequences of
alternative decisions. In particular we stressed the future costs of current
consumption decisions. When we introduced the transformation scheme
(utility function) in the instructions we wrote:
‘The more goods you buy in the current period the higher will
be the stock of goods in future periods and the smaller are the
Guilder receipts you can earn in future periods from the purchase
of the same amount of goods.’
This remark was then illustrated by examples which showed that the
purchase of a given amount of goods creates lower Guilder earnings at
higher stocks of the good. When subjects had ﬁnished reading the instruc-
tions they had to solve several exercises.7 The purpose of these exercises
was again to train their comprehension of the intertemporal consequences
of current decisions. No subject could start with the experiment until all
exercises had been solved correctly.8
At the beginning of each period, before the consumption decision was
made, subjects had been informed about the current stocks on (i) the
savings account and (ii) the Guilder account. In addition, the computer
screen (see Screen A1 in the Appendix) showed them (iii) the total
resources available for consumption and (iv) the current stock of addiction
capital (’current stock of goods’). When a consumption decision had been
made, the computer showed subjects explicitly on a new screen how this
decision affected these four variables (see Screen A2 in the Appendix).
Subjects then had the possibility to conﬁrm their decision or to change it.
Only in case of conﬁrmation was their decision implemented. In principle,
subjects could go back and forth in a given period as often as they wanted.
They could make as many preliminary decisions as they liked and examine
their consequences without implementing the decisions.
Before the start of the 30-period decision problem we allowed for two
further training opportunities. There was a 3-period decision problem and
a 30-minute training round. After the 30-minute training round, two
6Experimental instructions are available on request.
7Subjects used calculators to solve the exercises as well as during the experiment.
8To avoid embarrassment in the case of mistakes, we required subjects to write down the
whole computation process. If a subject made a mistake we indicated the error by encircling
the numbers in the computation which were wrong. Correct computations were marked
differently.
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the 3-period problem and during the training round we implemented the
same parameters as in the subsequent main rounds. Contrary to the main
rounds, however, there was no money at stake. Except for effort and time
costs training was, therefore, costless. The intention of the 3-period
problem was to make subjects familiar with the computer. They could
learn how to make and revise their decisions on the PC. The 30-minute
round, instead, gave them the opportunity to experiment with different
consumption paths. They could run as many 30-period problems as they
liked during this training round.9
After the training round the ﬁrst main round began. Subjects did not
know that there was a second main round. They were informed about it
only after they had ﬁnished the ﬁrst main round. After the second main
round subjects had to describe their strategies in a questionnaire. In addi-
tion, they were asked about what decisions they would implement if they
had another opportunity to solve the same 30-period problem. They
answered this question by drawing a consumption path into a table with a
ﬁne grid. In the following this hypothetical consumption path is dubbed
‘main round three’.10 Using data from three consecutive rounds enables us
to examine whether learning processes push consumption decisions closer
to the optimum or whether excess consumption is a persistent
phenomenon.
IV. Results11
Twenty-ﬁve undergraduate students of business administration from the
University of Vienna participated in this experiment which lasted approxi-
mately two hours and 15 minutes.12 Most subjects were between 19 and 21
years old. Roughly one third of the subjects were female, two thirds were
9In addition, once started, they did not have to ﬁnish a 30-period problem. They could stop
at any period and start the 30-period problem anew. Subjects also had the opportunity to end
the whole training round before 30 minutes were over. Yet, they made extensive use of
training opportunities. All of them made complete use of the available 30 minutes. During
the training round, most subjects tried to ﬁnd the best possible consumption path by trial and
error. Explicit computation of the optimal path was not possible because the subjects had no
knowledge of dynamic optimization techniques.
10In general, subjects drew a consumption path that did not obey the intertemporal budget
constraint. To meet this constraint we rescaled each individual’s path by proportionally
increasing or decredasing consumption levels in all periods. Our results below hold irrespec-
tive of whether we include the third main round in the statistical analysis.
11Our data are available on request.
12During the ﬁrst 45–60 minutes, subjects read the instructions, solved the exercises and
experimented with different consumption paths in the training round. The remaining 75–90
minutes were spent on consumption decisions in the two main rounds.
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(ATS).13 The lowest income achieved was ATS 175 while the highest
income was ATS 288. This indicates that there were substantial differences
in individual performance. The nature of the problem and the monetary
incentives gave rise to highly motivated subjects.
Actual and Optimal Consumption Paths
RESULT 1: Actual consumption paths are characterized by suboptimal
excess consumption in early periods and suboptimal underconsumption
during ﬁnal periods.
Figure 1 shows the average actual consumption path taken over all three
main rounds call in comparison with the optimal path. Until period 15,
subjects consume on average too much and from period 19 onwards they
consume too little. It is worthwhile to stress that this pattern occurs not
only when taking the average over all three main rounds. The same pattern
can be observed in each of the three main rounds. T-tests that compare
average consumption in main round one (c1), main round two (c2) and
main round three (c3) for each period indicate that there are no differ-
ences between the main rounds. Pairwise comparisons of c1, c2 and c3
reveal that the null hypothesis of equal average consumption levels cannot
be rejected at the 5 percent level for any period in the interval tb[1, 28].
Only in period 29 does c1 differ slightly from c2 and in period 30 c1 differs
somewhat from c3. This similarity between all main rounds indicates that
the forces which give rise to the deviation from the optimal path are
persistent, that is, they are not removed over time by subjects’ learning
processes. It seems that no signiﬁcant learning took place after the end of
the 30-minute training round. Our instructions and the many learning
opportunities offered by our design seem to have allowed subjects to learn
what is within their cognitive limits.
Figure 1 provides a misleading picture of the deviations from the
optimal path, as it does not take into account that the optimal path changes
as a result of past errors. The essential question, therefore, is whether
excess consumption is observed relative to the conditionally optimal
consumption path cco.
Actual and Conditionally Optimal Consumption Path
RESULT 2: Actual average consumption call is characterized by permanent
but eventually declining excess consumption relative to the conditionally
13This number also includes the show-up fee of ATS 70 (ATS 1002US$ 10).
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the conditionally optimal path.
Figure 2 provides support for R2. In Figure 2 we see the difference
between call and the average conditionally optimal path cco together with
Fig. 1. Average of actual paths for all main rounds and optimal path
Fig. 2. Difference between call and cco with 95% conﬁdence interval
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has several ups and downs between period 1 and period 20, but in general
there is neither an increasing nor a decreasing tendency. However, from
period 20 onwards, excess consumption gradually approaches zero,
although again with several ups and downs. From period 28 onwards we
can no longer reject the hypothesis that subjects were along the condi-
tionally optimal consumption path.15 Thus, R2 is well supported by the
data.
How much suboptimality in terms of foregone overall earnings did









T denotes the maximum overall payoff. n tells us by how many
percent actual overall earnings fall short of maximum overall earnings. The
average  n is given by 27.9 percent. Thus, although each consumption
decision may only cause small overall losses, the sum of all losses due to
suboptimal consumption decisions was, on average, quite substantial.
Evaluation of Questionnaires
After the experiment we asked subjects on what basis they had made their
decisions and whether they changed their strategies between round 1 and
round 2. We already know that there was no signiﬁcant behavioral differ-
ence between these rounds. This result is reinforced by the answers to the
questionnaire. Most subjects said that they tried to implement roughly the
same pattern of consumption decisions in both rounds. Yet, within the
limits of the globally ﬁxed strategy, they tried to achieve some ﬁne-tuning.
According to subjects’ answers we can identify several broad patterns:
A: To consume just the endowment with maximal deviations of ¹10.
B: To consume very little at the beginning such that there is an accumula-
tion of wealth At. This wealth is used towards the end for very high
consumption levels.
14To get cco we computed the conditionally optimal path for each individual in each period
and each session. We then took – for any period between 1 and 30 – the average over each
individual and each session. Thus one point represents the average over 75 values.
15We also conducted a nonparametric chi-square test of the null hypothesis that excess
consumption is equally likely as underconsumption in a given period. Except for period 30 –
where, by deﬁnition, there is no excess consumption – we can reject the null hypothesis in
favor of the alternative hypothesis that excess consumption is more likely (ps0.002).
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D: A more or less cyclical consumption pattern. High consumption at a
particular period is followed by several periods of rather low consump-
tion in order to allow for a depreciation of addiction capital. After that
there is again a period of high consumption, etc.
E: Compute the maximal temporary payoff per unit of consumption u(ct)/
ct. Since the maximization of u(ct)/ct implies rapidly increasing
consumption levels subjects who intentionally tried to implement this
behavioral pattern over some time either saved a lot during initial
periods or implemented a cyclical consumption pattern with an
approximate cycle length of four periods.
In Table 1 we show how many subjects can be associated with each
behavioral pattern. In addition we report the average degree of inefﬁ-
ciency, n, for each group. As one can see, behavioral pattern C, which
qualitatively resembles the optimal consumption path, exhibits the lowest
degree of inefﬁciency (14.7%). Yet, only ﬁve subjects deliberately followed
this strategy. Other subjects intended to implement strategies which do not
even qualitatively resemble the optimal path. As a consequence, their
consumption sequences caused considerably higher degrees of
suboptimality.
V. Interpretation and Potential Policy Implications
The data of our experiment show that actual consumption paths signiﬁ-
cantly deviate from the optimal path as well as from the conditionally
optimal path. Deviations are in no way irregular but follow a systematic
pattern. In relation to the conditionally optimal path, subjects consume too
much in almost all periods. During the ﬁrst 20 periods, excess consumption
has neither an increasing nor a decreasing trend but after period 20 it tends
to decrease until it vanishes in the last three periods.
How can we interpret this behavioral pattern? What are the factors that
contribute to systematic and persistent deviation from the optimal
consumption path? The starting point for our interpretation of the data is
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some circumstances these limitations represent binding constraints, while
in other circumstances they have no effects on behavior. In the context of
our experiment they are likely to be binding because it is a rather difﬁcult
task to compute the present value of future per-period costs and aggregate
it correctly. Yet, if subjects are unable to compute the aggregate present
value of future costs which is associated with each level of ct they face a
form of subjective uncertainty. Although objectively future costs are given
with certainty, subjects’ cognitive limitations generate a situation that is
characterized by subjective uncertainty. If they consume, say, ˜ ct, does the
true aggregate present value of future costs exceed or fall short of the
present beneﬁts of ˜ ct? We hypothesize that in the face of this subjective
uncertainty about what subjects should do, the psychologically relevant
features of the decision problem play an important role. In the context of
our intertemporal decision problem the fact that the present beneﬁts of ct
are relatively large, immediately available and, thus, unambiguously given
is likely to be of psychological relevance because it renders present beneﬁts
highly salient. In contrast, the fact that future costs per period are rela-
tively small, distributed over time and, thus, subjectively of ambiguous size
renders them much less salient. In the face of subjective uncertainty, the
combination of these psychological features of the decision problem is
likely to create an upwards bias of subjects’ perception of present beneﬁts
in relation to the aggregate present value of future costs.17
The above reasoning provides a plausible explanation of persistent
excess consumption during the ﬁrst 20 periods. However, how can we
account for the decrease in excess consumption during the last ten
periods? In our view it is plausible that the drive towards excess consump-
tion loses its force towards the end because costs are distributed over a
smaller number of future periods and are, therefore, more easily aggre-
gated to a correct number. Moreover, in the ﬁnal period and in the next to
ﬁnal period it is relatively easy to ﬁnd the optimal decision because there
is no longer any distributivity of future costs. In the ﬁnal period this is
trivially true because there are no future costs, whereas the decision in the
next to ﬁnal period can be based on one simple cost item: the decrease in
uT that is due to cTµ1. There is thus a plausible explanation of the
behavioral facts if cognitive limitations and the psychologically salient
features of the decision problem are taken into account.
16For an early analysis of the impact of cognitive limitations on individual and organizational
behavior, see Simon (1957).
17Note that the distributivity of future costs enters our argument twice. First, combined with
subjects’ cognitive limitations, it creates a state of subjective uncertainty. Second, it affects
subjects’ perception of present beneﬁts and future costs.
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657 Do addicts behave rationally?In our view the message of our results is twofold. Since we have
conducted an isomorphic test of the theory of rational addiction and since
the predictions are not met, the data cast doubts on the validity of this
theory. In addition, we think that we have identiﬁed a psychological factor
that contributes to the existence of irrationally myopic excess consump-
tion. Although we offered subjects a host of training and learning oppor-
tunities which were used readily, although subjects were highly motivated
and although they were highly skilled relative to the average skills of the
population, their choices reveal a systematic undervaluation of future
costs. It seems that their cognitive abilities did not allow them to integrate
distributed future costs into one correct number. This interpretation is also
supported by the fact that after period 20 subjects slowly approached the
conditionally optimal path. Since the number of cost items which has to be
taken into account declines as one approaches the last period, it becomes
easier to integrate future costs into a correct ﬁgure. Therefore, the cogni-
tive limitations of subjects have less impact towards the end.
Does this tell us anything about real-world addictions or real-world
consumption patterns? Well, if cognitive limits exert this sort of impact in
the laboratory, why should they be inoperative in the real world? Why
should an addict be less prone to cognitively undervalue distributed future
costs than an undergraduate student of business administration? If
anything, the opposite seems to be more likely. For some addictions it may
even be the case that the consumption of the addictive substance inhibits
the cognitive abilities of the addict. Therefore, if undervaluation of future
costs is really driven by cognitive limits the tendency to undervalue may
even increase over time.
The relevance of our results is not necessarily restricted to the case of
addictive behavior in a narrow sense. The starting point of our analysis is
that addictions obey certain qualitative hedonic regularities like saliency of
present beneﬁts and distributivity of future costs. However, this does not
mean that these regularities are completely absent in other consumption
activities. In fact, addictive behavior may be deﬁned as those activities in
which such hedonic regularities are particularly strong. But to the extent
that such regularities are also present in the consumption process of other
goods, our results will also have some relevance for these goods. Our
results may be particularly relevant for habit-forming goods because addic-
tion can be viewed as a special case of habit formation. Take for example
the case where an activity involves high present costs while the beneﬁts are
distributed over many future periods.18 If we apply our reasoning to this
situation, we would predict that individuals underinvest in such activities.
18The acquisition of human capital and many health activities seem to be characterized by
these hedonic regularities.
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658 E. Fehr and P. K. ZychThis might provide a justiﬁcation for public interventions that alleviate this
underinvestment.
The previous argument leads us directly to the potential policy implica-
tions of our results. In our experiment too many resources were used for
consumption in early periods. In reality, however, it is also possible that
overconsumption of one good is ﬁnanced by the suboptimal undercon-
sumption of other goods. Rationality failures may, therefore, generate
suboptimal consumption structures. It may be that those goods, which
exhibit the hedonic regularities of what we have called addictive goods, are
overconsumed at the expense of those goods where these hedonic regular-
ities are absent. By means of differential goods taxation it could be possible
to correct for these efﬁciency-reducing distortions. In this way ‘sin taxes’
may be justiﬁed on efﬁciency grounds even in the absence of any
externalities.
Appendix
Due to space limitations we do not present the whole set of instructions in
this appendix. Instead we only show the decision screen, the conﬁrmation
screen, and the utility matrix (transformation scheme) of the
experiment.
Screen A1. Decision screen
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in the Current stock of goods
current
period 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 125 150 200 250 300
0 0.0 µ0.6 µ1.2 µ1.8 µ2.4 µ3.0 µ3.6 µ4.2 µ4.8 µ5.4 µ6.0 µ7.5 µ9.1 µ12.1 µ15.2 µ18.3
1 0.6 0.0 µ0.6 µ1.2 µ1.8 µ2.4 µ3.0 µ3.6 µ4.2 µ4.8 µ5.4 µ6.9 µ8.5 µ11.5 µ14.6 µ17.7
2 1.2 0.6 0.0 µ0.6 µ1.2 µ1.8 µ2.4 µ3.0 µ3.6 µ4.2 µ4.8 µ6.4 µ7.9 µ10.9 µ14.0 µ17.1
3 1.8 1.2 0.6 0.0 µ0.6 µ1.2 µ1.8 µ2.4 µ3.0 µ3.7 µ4.3 µ5.8 µ7.3 µ10.3 µ13.4 µ16.5
4 2.3 1.7 1.1 0.5 µ0.1 µ0.7 µ1.3 µ1.9 µ2.5 µ3.1 µ3.7 µ5.2 µ6.7 µ9.8 µ12.8 µ15.9
5 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.1 0.5 µ0.1 µ0.7 µ1.3 µ1.9 µ2.5 µ3.1 µ4.6 µ6.1 µ9.2 µ12.2 µ15.3
6 3.4 2.8 2.2 1.6 1.0 0.4 µ0.2 µ0.8 µ1.4 µ2.0 µ2.6 µ4.1 µ5.6 µ8.6 µ11.7 µ14.7
7 4.0 3.4 2.8 2.2 1.6 1.0 0.4 µ0.2 µ0.8 µ1.4 µ2.0 µ3.5 µ5.0 µ8.1 µ11.1 µ14.2
8 4.5 3.9 3.3 2.7 2.1 1.5 0.9 0.3 µ0.3 µ0.9 µ1.5 µ3.0 µ4.5 µ7.5 µ10.6 µ13.8
9 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.2 2.6 2.0 1.4 0.8 0.2 µ0.4 µ1.0 µ2.5 µ4.0 µ7.0 µ10.1 µ13.1
10 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.7 3.1 2.5 1.9 1.3 0.7 0.1 µ0.5 µ2.0 µ3.5 µ6.5 µ9.5 µ12.6
11 6.0 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.0 2.4 1.8 1.2 0.6 0.0 µ1.5 µ3.0 µ6.0 µ9.0 µ12.1
12 6.5 5.9 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.5 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.1 0.5 µ1.0 µ2.5 µ5.5 µ8.5 µ11.6
13 7.0 6.4 5.8 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.4 2.8 2.2 1.6 1.0 µ0.5 µ2.0 µ5.0 µ8.0 µ11.1
14 7.4 6.8 6.2 5.6 5.0 4.5 3.9 3.3 2.7 2.1 1.5 0.0 µ1.5 µ4.5 µ7.6 µ10.6
15 7.9 7.3 6.7 6.1 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.7 3.1 2.5 1.9 0.4 µ1.1 µ4.1 µ7.1 µ10.1
16 8.3 7.7 7.1 6.5 6.0 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.0 2.4 0.9 µ0.6 µ3.6 µ6.6 µ9.7
17 8.8 8.2 7.6 7.0 6.4 5.8 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.4 2.8 1.3 µ0.2 µ3.2 µ6.2 µ9.2
18 9.2 8.6 8.0 7.4 6.8 6.2 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.3 1.8 0.3 µ2.7 µ5.7 µ8.8
19 9.6 9.0 8.4 7.8 7.2 6.6 6.1 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.7 2.2 0.7 µ2.3 µ5.3 µ8.3
20 10.0 9.4 8.8 8.2 7.6 7.1 6.5 5.9 5.3 4.7 4.1 2.6 1.1 µ1.9 µ4.9 µ7.9
21 10.4 9.8 9.2 8.6 8.0 7.5 6.9 6.3 5.7 5.1 4.5 3.0 1.5 µ1.5 µ4.5 µ7.5
22 10.8 10.2 9.6 9.0 8.4 7.8 7.2 6.7 6.1 5.5 4.9 3.4 1.9 µ1.1 µ4.1 µ7.1
23 11.2 10.6 10.0 9.4 8.8 8.2 7.6 7.0 6.4 5.9 5.3 3.8 2.3 µ0.7 µ3.7 µ6.7
24 11.5 10.9 10.3 9.8 9.2 8.6 8.0 7.4 6.8 6.2 5.6 4.2 2.7 µ0.3 µ3.3 µ6.3
25 11.9 11.3 10.7 10.1 9.5 8.9 8.4 7.8 7.2 6.6 6.0 4.5 3.0 0.1 µ2.9 µ5.9
26 12.2 11.6 11.1 10.5 9.9 9.3 8.7 8.1 7.5 6.9 6.3 4.9 3.4 0.4 µ2.6 µ5.6
27 12.6 12.0 11.4 10.8 10.2 9.6 9.0 8.5 7.9 7.3 6.7 5.2 3.7 0.8 µ2.2 µ5.2
28 12.9 12.3 11.7 11.1 10.5 10.0 9.4 8.8 8.2 7.6 7.0 5.5 4.1 1.1 µ1.9 µ4.9
29 13.2 12.6 12.0 11.4 10.9 10.3 9.7 9.1 8.5 7.9 7.3 5.9 4.4 1.4 µ1.6 µ4.6
30 13.5 12.9 12.3 11.8 11.2 10.6 10.0 9.4 8.8 8.2 7.7 6.2 4.7 1.7 µ1.2 µ4.2
31 13.8 13.2 12.6 12.0 11.5 10.9 10.3 9.7 9.1 8.5 8.0 6.5 5.0 2.0 µ0.9 µ3.9
32 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.3 11.8 11.2 10.6 10.0 9.4 8.8 8.2 6.8 5.3 2.3 µ0.6 µ3.6
33 14.4 13.8 13.2 12.6 12.0 11.4 10.9 10.3 9.7 9.1 8.5 7.1 5.6 2.6 µ0.3 µ3.3
34 14.6 14.0 13.5 12.9 12.3 11.7 11.1 10.5 10.0 9.4 8.8 7.3 5.9 2.9 µ0.1 µ3.0
35 14.9 14.3 13.7 13.1 12.6 12.0 11.4 10.8 10.2 9.6 9.1 7.6 6.1 3.2 0.2 µ2.8
40 16.0 15.4 14.8 14.3 13.7 13.1 12.5 12.0 11.4 10.8 10.2 8.8 7.3 4.4 1.4 µ1.6
45 16.9 16.3 15.7 15.2 14.6 14.0 13.4 12.8 12.3 11.7 11.1 9.7 8.2 5.3 2.4 µ0.6
50 17.5 16.9 16.4 15.8 15.2 14.6 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.3 11.8 10.3 8.9 6.0 3.1 0.1
55 17.9 17.3 16.7 16.2 15.6 15.0 14.5 13.9 13.3 12.7 12.2 10.7 9.3 6.4 3.5 0.6
60 18.0 17.4 16.9 16.3 15.7 15.2 14.6 14.0 13.5 12.9 12.3 10.9 9.5 6.6 3.7 0.8
65 17.9 17.3 16.8 16.2 15.6 15.1 14.5 13.9 13.4 12.8 12.2 10.8 9.4 6.5 3.7 0.8
70 17.5 16.9 16.4 15.8 15.3 14.7 14.1 13.6 13.0 12.5 11.9 10.5 9.1 6.2 3.4 0.5
75 16.9 16.3 15.8 15.2 14.7 14.1 13.5 13.0 12.4 11.9 11.3 9.9 8.5 5.7 2.8 0.0
80 16.0 15.4 14.9 14.3 13.8 13.2 12.7 12.1 11.6 11.0 10.5 9.1 7.7 4.8 2.0 µ0.8
85 14.9 14.3 13.8 13.2 12.7 12.1 11.6 11.0 10.5 9.9 9.4 8.0 6.6 3.8 1.0 µ1.9
90 13.5 13.0 12.4 11.9 11.3 10.8 10.2 9.7 9.1 8.6 8.0 6.6 5.2 2.5 µ0.3 µ3.2
95 11.9 11.3 10.8 10.2 9.7 9.2 8.6 8.1 7.5 7.0 6.4 5.0 3.7 0.9 µ1.9 µ4.7
100 10.0 9.5 8.9 8.4 7.8 7.3 6.7 6.2 5.7 5.1 4.6 3.2 1.8 µ0.9 µ3.7 µ6.5
105 7.9 7.3 6.8 6.3 5.7 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.0 2.5 1.1 µ0.2 µ3.0 µ5.7 µ8.5
110 5.5 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 2.8 2.3 1.7 1.2 0.7 0.1 µ1.2 µ2.6 µ5.3 µ8.0 µ10.8
115 2.9 2.3 1.8 1.3 0.7 0.2 µ0.3 µ0.9 µ1.4 µ1.9 µ2.5 µ3.8 µ5.2 µ7.9 µ10.6 µ13.3
120 0.0 µ0.5 µ1.1 µ1.6 µ2.1 µ2.6 µ3.2 µ3.7 µ4.2 µ4.8 µ5.3 µ6.6 µ8.0 µ10.7 µ13.4 µ16.1
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